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Beginning in 1978, China’s industrial revolution has progressed for several decades. There 
are generally two phases of China’s industrial reform: first during the 1980s, China did not 
privatize significant numbers of state-owned firms; secondly after the mid-1990s, China 
launched the second wave of industrial reforms, featuring privatization and corporatization. 
Especially in the realm of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) reform, after 1997’s 15th Congress 
of the Communist Party, the “mainstream” of SOEs reform was “grasping the large, and 
letting the small go”, namely to reorganize large SOEs to become even larger and more 
competitive groups, and to privatize middle and small SOEs at the time. Yet what caused the 
large scale privatization? Has it improved SOEs performance, and what are its negative 
impacts? What is the future of the policy? All remains very complicated. As Megginson and 
Netter (2001) point out: 
 
One of the more complex issues in this area involves the interrelated questions of when to privatize, 
whether to privatize rapidly or slowly, what order to follow in privatizing firms (sequencing), whether to 
sell a SOE at once or in stages (staging), whether to restructure a SOE prior to sale (or to just restructure 
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In this paper, I’ll focus on the analysis of privatization of small and medium sized SOEs. The 
following sections will be organized as: section 2 will discuss problems prior to privatization 
and its process; section 3 will examine why China’s privatization took the form it did; section 
4 will evaluate the policy and the following section will point out the reason why it is 
insufficient or ineffective; the last section will offer some feasible policy recommendations. 
 
Pre-privatization Problems and the Reform Process 
Problems 
With its double-digit economic growth for several decades, China has been well known for its 
economic reforms, especially in the state-owned enterprises. Between 1978 and 1993 the 
share of SOEs in the Chinese economy was dominant, and township village enterprises 
(TVEs) produced over 40 percent of China’s exports and employed more than 40 per cent of 
nation’s industrial workers. (Bowles and Dong 1999) By 1993, growth of the non-state sector 
had transformed China’s economy without closing any state-owned enterprises.2 However, 
after 1993 the profit per capita of TVEs and urban SOEs began falling and eventually China 
witnessed the large-scale privatization of SOEs. “By early 1993 it had become evident that 
                                                             
1
 Megginson, W.L., Netter, J.M., 2001. “From state to market: a survey of empirical studies on privatization”, Journal of 
Economic Literature 39, pp. 321– 389 
2 See Cao, Yuanzheng, Qian, Yingyi, and Weingast Barry R., “From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese 
Style”, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999, pp. 104. This paper also classified the ownership 
structure of Chinese firms in 1993: state-owned enterprises (SOEs), collective enterprises (urban collectives and rural 
collectives; The latter are also known as TVEs), and private enterprises (including foreign firms). The latter two together are 
referred to as “non-state-ownership” while the first two together are referred to as “public –ownership of firms”. 
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the lack of fundamental SOE reforms had seriously undermined China’s development.”3 
Figure 1 shoes some key performance indicators including total profits. We can observe that 
in the early and middle 90s, although the sales revenue increased steadily, the total profits of 
SOEs staggered. Several problems emerging at this time can explain the privatization. 
 
Figure 1: Performance indicators of China’s state owned & holding enterprises, 
1993-2009, RMB million 
 
 
Source: CEIC  
 
In urban areas, for SOEs, the problem of surplus labor was a huge concern for central 
authorities. For some firms in old industrial centers developed on the traditional Soviet model, 
and some firms that lost their advantage after the entry of non-state firms, surplus 
employment was more acute than asset problems. In addition, in 1994 there were about 
300,000 SOEs (including 100,000 in industry) with about 75 million state employees 
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(including 43 million in industry).
4
 Among all these SOEs approximately half were 
loss-making and had continued to consume a great portion of bank credit and other resources. 
At this time China was facing thorny problems in state enterprises. 
 
At the rural level, Qian (2000) offered one insightful explanation. Qian divides the period 
between 1978 and 1999 into two stages: 1978-93 and 1994-1999. During the first stage, both 
state and market institution were imperfect and existing institution offered TVEs and private 
enterprises (PEs) both advantages and disadvantages. By using community government 
assistance, TVEs were thought to have better access to bank loans, and easier access to SOE 
technology and inputs that were in short supply. Also, in order to achieve community 
objectives, local governments (LGs) often induced both TVEs and PEs to adopt output targets 
or labor hiring goals that could potentially push the enterprises away from profit-maximizing 
production practices. However, by 1994, the state sector was no longer the major source of 
national industrial output and the official Communist Party line was to embrace a market 
system with private ownership and further develop market-supporting institutions based on 
the rule of law and incorporation of international best practices being established.5 Thus 
TVEs lost their comparative advantage in the first stage, and the banking reform in mid 1990s 
offered banks incentives to allocate financial resources to more productive uses. Under a 
more profit-driven and market-oriented economic environment, TVEs began to be less 
profitable and were regarded as financial burdens by local governments. Other works 
including Fang and Smith (2008) demonstrated that although TVEs hold institutional 
                                                             
4 Ibid., pp 111 
5 Ibid., 
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advantages, they were less financially efficient than PEs. Over time, the institutional 





Due to huge problems remaining in China’s SOEs, privatization, as one of the policy baskets 
provided by the central government to improve SOE performance, has become very 
significant in China since the end of the 1990s.
7
 Privatization mainly concerns assets and 
ownership changes. One milestone was the adoption of the Company Law in 1994, which 
provided a uniform legal framework into which different ownership forms fit. “The adoption 
of the Company Law signaled the beginning of a new round of institutional change, the 
effects of which were felt only gradually.” (Lin and Zhu 2001) Under the framework of 
Company Law, the “corporatizing” SOEs attained an official position in China’s legal system, 
which meant the policy-makers allowed diversified ownership, and any ownership form 
could operate. 
 
Then in September 1997, the 15
th
 Congress of China’s Communist Party began to initiate a 
series of SOEs reform, namely “grasping the large and letting the small go”, starting the 
privatizing of small and medium sized SOEs while private capital was also permitted to 
penetrate into “pillar” and “basic” industries in the form of private equity participation in 
large SOEs.
8
 The reform was planned to be operated in three levels
9
: privatization of small 
                                                             
6 Fang, Xiangming, and Smith, Rodney B. W., “Barriers to Efficiency and Privatization of Township-Village Enterprises”, 
Journal of Development Studies, March 2008 
7 Shu Y. Ma (2008) argues that the de facto privatization has already been underway since the mid-1980s, under the name of 
“shareholding system reform”.  
8 See W. K. Lau, “The 15th Congress of Chinese Communist Party: milestone in Chinese Privatization”, Capital & Class, 
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SOEs in county level; mass lay-off of SOE workers at the city level; and mergers, 
groupings/conglomerations, corporatizations, and initial public offerings (IPO) of some large 
SOEs which often involve the central government. In particular, for privatization, “letting the 
small go” offered local government much greater authority to restructure their own firms and, 
in particular, to privatize or close down some of them. 
 
According to Ma (2008), China’s SOEs privatization was implemented in three phases: first, 
during 1997 to 2001 there was an “implicit privatization”, when a three-year target was set to 
eliminate the deficits of most large and medium-sized SOEs through “strategic restructuring”, 
and the stock market was expected “to serve the function of relieving SOEs’ difficult 
conditions.” This was followed by a wave of “reduction of holding of state-owned shares” 
(RHSOS, or guoyougu jianchi) through backdoor listing (i.e., SOEs used state shares to 
purchase inactive listed companies). Then from 2001 to 2002, it was called the 
“pension-driven privatization”, which finally failed because the two conflicted programs - 
RHSOS and social security reform - were linked together. Then a “deadlock” appeared from 
2003 to 2004, when a high powered central agency State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Committee (SASAC) was established to prevent depletion of state assets. The 
tension between SASAC and China Securities Regulatory Commission which was more 
concerned about the interest of share investors resulted in a deadlock during 2003 to 2004. 
Since 2005 a breakthrough occurred when the “share conversion” reform pilot program was 
launched, whose purpose is to solve the “division” between “equities” (gu) and “rights” 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
Summer 1999, pp. 51-87 
9 Cao, Yuanzheng, Qian, Yingyi, and Weingast Barry R., “From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style”, 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999, pp. 104-105 
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(quan). The pilot program was completed within four months after its introduction, and in 
early September 2005 the “share conversion” reform was officially launched nationwide. By 
late April 2006, a year after the introduction of the pilot program, 868 listed companies 
accounting for about 70% of total market capitalization had already completed conversion of 




Why Privatization Took Place? 
“Chinese-style” privatization 
On a macro level, as mentioned above, the Chinese privatization was characterized as a 
gradual and selective policy, or a 2R policy (retain government control of large enterprises 
that operate in the strategic sectors and retreat from small and medium-sized enterprises that 
operate in highly competitive markets)
11
, compared to the big-bang mass privatization 
adopted by Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union countries: retain government control of 
large enterprises that operate in the strategic sectors and retreat from small and medium sized 




On a micro level, as to the choice of privatization strategy in China, insider privatization 
prevailed, and outsiders could hardly gain access to buying state enterprises.
13
 Two policy 
                                                             
10 Yet Ma still regarded the “share conversion” pilot reform as a Chinese style “gradualist” program of privatization rather 
than a “shock-therapy”. For more details on the historic process of privatization since 1997, refer to Ma, Shu Y., “China’s 
Privatization: from Gradualism to Shock Therapy?”, Asian Survey, 2008 
11
 Eg. Green & Liu, 2005 
12 Liu, Guy S., and Sun, Pei, “The Political Economy of Chinese Style Privatization: Motives and Constraints”, World 
Development, Vol. 34, No. 12, 2006, pp 1 
13 Zeng, Jin, “Political Compromises: The Privatization of Small and Medium Sized Public Enterprises in China”, Journal 
of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies, 2010 
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precedents were crucial in setting off the current wave of privatization.
14
 The first was the 
development in the mid-1990s of a transitional ownership form, originally for TVEs, called 
joint-stock cooperatives. The second precedent was established when the well-known 
Chinese computer company Lianxiang converted to a corporation. In this case, the founding 
managerial team was clearly responsible for the success of the company, which they had 
created from scratch. (Naughton 2005) Thereafter a majority of small and medium sized 
public enterprises were sold to their former managers and workers. According to surveys in 
some provinces, three forms of ownership account for more than half of all privatization: 
sales to private domestic or foreign investors or firms (chushou); incorporation into a limited 
liability or joint stock company (gongsizhi); and stock co-operatives where most parts of 
shares are sold to employees. Stock co-operatives accounted for about 35 percent of all 




Secondly, as Qian and Weingast argued, the liquidity and wealth constraints of potential 
buyers were less of a problem in China, while these problems were major concerns in the 
design of privatization programs in Eastern Europe and Russia and are partially responsible 
for the free distribution of shares. Chinese people have accumulated significant amount of 
private savings in a form of bank deposit since the commencement of reform, and most SOEs 
debt-asset ratios are very high to the extent that net wealth of these firms is very small 
relative to assets, sometimes even close to zero. Thus in many cases, the employees can 
afford to buy these firms with their own savings. 
                                                             
14 Naughton, Barry, The Chinese Economy: Transition and Growth, MIT Press 2005, pp. 323 
15 Cao, Yuanzheng, Qian, Yingyi, and Weingast Barry R., “From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style”, 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999, pp. 110 
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Thirdly, there are apparent difference between urban SOE privatization and rural TVE 
privatization. Generally speaking, the privatization in urban SOEs tended to be more gradual 
and involved a more limited transfer of property rights to private investors than what 
happened in rural TVEs. Besides, as Dong, Putterman and Unel argued, the privatization of 
SOEs exhibited selection bias as the worse performing enterprises were the principal targets 
of reforms; while in contrast, pre-reform performance did not play a role in determining the 





In general, what are the factors leading to the Chinese style of “grasping the large, letting go 
of the small”? The major reason is the different level of central and local SOE development 
over the 20 years since the start of the reform. After 20 years of reform, the central 
government’ earlier policies were increasingly focused on energy, natural resources, and a 
few economic sectors of substantial scale. These sectors are often protected by high entry 
barriers, and they remained profitable. Thus the central government was willing to keep 
controll of these “above-scale” enterprises. On the contrary, in the 1990s those enterprises run 
by local government were much smaller in scale than central ones, and were much more 
exposed to competitive pressures and much less profitable. As a result, the local government 
had incentives to get rid of loss-making enterprises due to the fact that most of small and 
medium sized SOEs were losing money in early 1990s. More specifically, as Qian and 
                                                             
16 See Dong, Xiao-yuan, Putterman, Louis, and Unel, Bulent, “Privatization and Firm Performance: A Comparison between 
Rural and Urban Enterprises in China”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 34 2006. However, some other scholars pointed 
out that those SOEs with mediocre performance are most likely chosen for privatization. 
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Weingast argued, harder budget constraints of local government and increased competition 





Besides, political compromise among local officials, managers and workers of SOEs might 
be responsible for the prevalence of stock co-operative ownership. Jin Zeng (2010) conducted 
a case study in privatization in Shanghai, Shenyang, and Xiamen, and explained that the 
prevalence of insider privatization results from the political compromises among district 
officials, managers and workers of public enterprises when the local officials perceive the 





Moreover, some scholars express a “political-benefits” view to explain the motives of 
privatization, arguing that “to assess the constraints on and possibilities for privatization, one 
must have a clear picture of . . . the gains and losses that will be sustained by the constituent 
elements of dominant political coalitions”19 With its application to China, Liu, Sun and Woo 
(2006) argued that incentives for sale have been created by the increasingly hardened budget 
constraints faced by local officials, intensified market competition, the likely improved 
post-privatization performance, and the magnitude of the private benefits from which local 
                                                             
17 Cao, Yuanzheng, Qian, Yingyi, and Weingast Barry R., “From Federalism, Chinese Style to Privatization, Chinese Style”, 
The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1999, pp. 121 
18 Zeng, Jin, “Political Compromises: The Privatization of Small and Medium Sized Public Enterprises in China”, Journal 
of Chinese Political Science/Association of Chinese Political Studies, 2010 
19 Bienen and Waterbury 1989, p618 
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leaders can expect to derive after privatization.
20
 Some of these benefits may include the 
existence of localities’ private control as well as political interests in post-privatized 
companies. 
 
Last but not least, from the view of fiscal budget, Qian and Roland (1998), Cao (1999) and Li 
(2000) pointed out that the tighter budget for local government was one of the most crucial 
drives behind privatization. First, the fiscal and monetary recentralization in the 1990s 
contributed to the significant hardening of budget constraints on local governments, which 
means that they now have to assume the primary responsibility for local economies, in 
correspondence with their control of independent revenue sources granted by the 1980s 
decentralization. Second, the intensification of cross-regional competition in product markets 
is the driving force behind local governments privatizing their enterprises to supply more 
incentives to managers and to improve the enterprises’ competitiveness, which in turn 
increases their fiscal revenue. 
 
The resurgence of state-sector 
After several years of encouragement of private sector development, the percentage of 
state-owned enterprises in industrial production has fallen from approximately 80% at the 
beginning of the reform, to about 30% in 2008. However, one heat debated topic on China’s 
SOE reform in the past decade is whether or not the state sector was re-emphasized by the 
central authority, while the private sector was stifled. This new trend is labeled as “the state 
                                                             
20 Liu, Guy S., and Sun, Pei, “The Political Economy of Chinese Style Privatization: Motives and Constraints”, World 
Development, Vol. 34, No. 12, 2006, pp 1 
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advances and the private sector retreats” (guojin mintui). 
 
As stated in previous sections, at the beginning of the SOE reform, not only did those large 
SOEs in key industries got privatized but they were even restructured as “national 
champions”. These key industries include: 1) industries related to national securities; 2) 
natural resources which the state monopolies; 3) industries that produce public goods and 
social welfare. In 2003, the establishment of the State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Administration Committee (SASAC) brought a turning point to the falling state sector. This 
agency’s task is “to revitalize the SOEs and to reorganize them from money-losing into 
profitable firms, through restructuring and consolidation.”21 Li Rongrong, the chairman of 
SASAC declared that “country’s seven major industries, including electricity and grid, 
petroleum and petrochemical, telecommunications, coal, civil aviation, and maritime, should 
be exclusively owned by the state, while excluding any domestic private entities.”22 
 
Meanwhile, China’s plan of massive investment in infrastructure and the global financial 
crisis offered another great opportunity to the state-sector in the way that the crisis had a 
greater impact on China’s private sector as most of private enterprises are dependent on 
export, while large SOEs focus on the domestic market. Moreover, in November 2008 the 
central government announced a 4 trillion RMB expansion plan on domestic demand, 
focusing on investment in infrastructure such as railways, roads, and airports, which are 
mostly monopolized by state-owned enterprises. In early 2009, a stimulus plan (USD 540 
                                                             
21 Jialin Zhang, “The Advance of China’s State Sector: Some Implications for the China’s Economy”, 
www.ChinaUSFriendship.com, August 1, 2010 
22 Ibid., 
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billion) for 10 key industries also benefited SOEs by encouraging mergers and acquisitions 
(M&A) led by large SOEs to foster large and strong companies. 
 
There are examples in various sectors which SOEs benefit from. In the real estate sector, 
some state-owned real estate developers have tight relationship with local government, whose 
public finance rely on selling lands to a very large extent. This close tie raises broad concerns 
and media often criticized state-owned developers as “land king” who are pushing up the 
housing prices in major cities such as Beijing and Shanghai. In 2009 state-owned developers 
purchased 60% of the 10 most expensive plots which were on sale. Many winning bidders 
have close ties with the government. For example, a property company as a subsidiary of the 
state-owned Sinochem Group bought a plot in Beijing for nearly 4 billion RMB, making it 
the most expensive plot across the country. Another plot in Beijing’s outskirts was sold for 3 




In the steel industry, in September 2009 the state-owned Shangdong Iron and Steel Group Co. 
Ltd., which lost money for a long time, acquired the private Rizhao Iron and Steel Co. Ltd,. 
The latter is one of the countries’ largest private steel companies. This deal in turn created the 
second largest steel company in China. In Shanghai the Baoshan Steel Group, a famous SOE, 
acquired the private Ninbo Steel Company.
24
 In the oil industry, the China Petroleum (CNPC) 
acquired most of the non-state oil companies in Heilongjiang Province.
25 
                                                             
23 “The State Advances, The Private Sector Retreats, - Crisis Economic Policy in China”, Global Policy Journal, May 13, 
2010 
24 “Asia: Nationalisation rides again; China's state-owned enterprises”, The Economists, London: Nov 14, 2009. Vol. 393, 
Iss. 8657; pg. 52 
25 Jialin Zhang, “The Advance of China’s State Sector: Some Implications for the China’s Economy”, 
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In addition, in July 2009 the China National Cereals Group (COFCO) invested in and 
purchased 20% share of the private Mengniu Dairy Company, the country’s leading dairy 
producer. This is the largest-ever deal in the Chinese food industry, and COFCO has become 
the largest shareholder of Mengniu. COFCO business goes far beyond food and beverages, to 
include residential and commercial real estate. In Shanxi, the provincial government ordered 
a reorganization of the coal industry. The share of private capital in that industry is not 
supposed to exceed 30 percent. Many private coal mining factories are complaining about 




In this section I’ll evaluate the policy of privatization by analyzing the pros and cons brought 
by the implementation of the policy to SOE performance, economic efficiency, and social 
stability. In particular, the impacts of “state advances” discussed in the previous section will 
also be covered. 
 
Pros 
In general, for urban SOEs, ownership structure has been changed drastically. After more 
than 30 years of economic reform and 15 years of privatization, the ownership form of China 
has been transformed to the extent that, at the beginning of the century, the private sector 
already accounted for more than 40% of output and employment of national industry. 
                                                                                                                                                                                             
www.ChinaUSFriendship.com, August 1, 2010 
26 “Asia: Nationalisation rides again; China's state-owned enterprises”, The Economists, London: Nov 14, 2009. Vol. 393, 
Iss. 8657; pg. 52 
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Privatization along with the revised ownership structure will have positive influences on 
several aspects. 
Figure 2: State-owned and state-holding industrial enterprises 1998-2007 
 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 
 
Figure 3: Percentage of SOE in all Industry output 1993-2003 
 
Source: Jie Shen (2007). Labour Disputes and Their Resolution in China. Oxford, England: Chandos 
Publishing. 
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Conventional wisdom reveals that privatized enterprises will have better performance and 
become more efficient. Alchian (1977), in a paper argues that behavior under public 
ownership is different from that under private ownership “not because the objectives sought 
by organizations under each form are different, but, instead, even with the same explicit 
organizational goals, the cost-rewards system impinging on the employees and the ‘owners’ 
of the organizations are different.” He proposed the following theorem, “Under public 
ownership the cost of any decision or choice are less fully thrust upon the selectors than 
under private property.”27 
 
After reviewing previous literature on the impacts of privatization on firm performance, I 
believe it is evident that privatization had positive impacts on firms’ performance (see Figure 
1), but controlling selection bias and endogeneity in the reforming process is important. 
Using a survey of 736 firms drawn from five cities and seven sectors for 1996 to 2001, Yusuf 
et al. (2005) shows the conventional results that foreign ownership, reformed SOEs, and 
non-SOE ownership all enhance productivity. However, when the authors use fixed effects to 
control for potential endogeneity and selection bias, they find that the impact of restructuring 
is not robust. Although they find no strong statistical evidence that restructuring has led to 
productivity gains, their survey provides evidence of upgrading following restructuring, 
including the introduction of new production technologies. However, since technology 
acquisition requires an established absorptive capacity, this finding is also consistent with the 
proposition that the most efficient firms are those selected for reform and, hence, controlling 
                                                             
27 Alchian, A. A., “Some Economics of Property Rights”, Economic Forces at Work, Vol. 127, Liberty Press 1977, pp. 49 
Weatherhead East Asian Institute 
Columbia University 
 17 / 30 
 
for selectivity bias is crucial.  
 
Song and Yao (2004) use a survey of enterprise data covering 683 firms in 11 cities over the 
period from 1995 to 2001. They find that state control and private control lead to higher 
profitability than state ownership but find little impact of these restructurings on unit cost and 
productivity. Like the previous authors, they find that introducing fixed effects reduces the 
statistical significance of the relevant estimates. According to Bai, Lu and Tao (2009)’s 
empirical research, the privatization of SOEs was found to have positive impact on sales and 
hence led to higher labor productivity. At the same time, there was a gain in firm profitability 
contributed to mostly by the reduction of managerial expenses to sales.
28
 These suggest that 
it is inefficient to keep state-owned enterprises while as a way of maintaining social stability, 
and necessary to establish an efficient and independent social welfare system. 
 
Cons 
Apart from positive effects it brought to SOEs performance and efficiency, privatization will 
also lead to some negative effects on social stability. Privatization has aroused some 
discontent among workers. One irony is that privatization, schemed and controlled by the 
Communist Party to better reform the economy, got resisted and discontent among workers in 
a traditional “communist” way. Feng Chen’s work demonstrated that with an aggressive 
implementation of privatization schemes, labor struggles have emerged in which companies 
are increasingly permeated by “class consciousness”. Workers’ previous experiences with 
                                                             
28 Bai Chong-en, Lu, Jiangyong, and Tao, Zhigang, “How Does Privatization Work in China?”, Journal of Comparative 
Economics, 37 2009 
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socialism shape the way they comprehend privatization. In many cases, privatization often 
triggered organized resistance as workers perceived a legitimate target to oppose and a 
contestable interest to defend, and felt it politically defensible to reject capitalism in the name 




Another irony has something to do with the state-enterprise relationship: the original purpose 
of SOEs privatization was to make local government get rid of less-profitable SOEs, but in 
many cases the local government has de facto dominated the process of the reform, and will 
continue to retain control over the SOE. Hu (2000) mentioned that the mode by which an 
SOE is transformed has thus far been dictated by the local government involved: the 
government selects the strategy and timing of the reform pursued for each SOE and even 
chooses merger partners as well as those who will be able to buy stocks in or purchase the 
SOE at stake. When SOEs merge, the resulting new enterprises are still state-owned 
operations. In joint-stock companies, the state tends to hold a majority of shares. In other 
cases, the state may lease out all of or some SOE assets.
30
 Thus in this sense, the 
privatization has not been well implemented since the state continues to hold significant 
influence in local level enterprises. Consequently, the remaining state’s leverage on the local 
enterprises will influence the policy-making and strategy-selection of companies according to 
political interest rather than market-oriented factors. In sum, the privatization reform was 
incomplete. 
 
                                                             
29 Chen, Feng, “Privatization and Its Discontents in Chinese Factories”, The China Quarterly, 2006 
30 Hu, Xiaobo, “Impact of the New Round of SOE Reform”, Asian Survey, 2000, pp10 
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The impact of privatization on employment is more complex. Privatization is not only a 
political economic issue, but also related to social policy, since one important aspect of 
privatization is mass lay-off of employees from traditional SOEs. According to Rawski 
(2002), there were approximately 6 million out of 44 million industrial workers in the 
industrial state sector, by the end of the century.
31
 Based on Ministry of Labor and Social 
Security (MOLSS), there are 21 million workers that were laid off during 1994 between 2005. 
(Table 1) How to ensure social stability when large amounts of workers lost their positions 
from prior “iron rice bowl” remained to be critical for the central government, since social 
stability turned out to be the priority of CCP after the Tiananmen Event in 1989. Local 
government adopted a series of policies to assist laid-off workers reemployed. When SOEs 
were sold, buyers were required to sign a contract arranging for the redeployment of 
employees. Government funds, such as the state asset exit fund and the SOE bankruptcy 
provisional fund, were established to finance compensation and re-deploy workers.
32
 In some 
cases, the government would pay extra subsides to cover the redeployment of employees. In 





Some scholars argue that privatization and mass laid-off workers brought social unrest, as the 
central government’s re-employment policy was not efficient enough. Solinger (2002) 
pointed out that the non-state sectors generally have more work for rural migrants or the 
highly-educated than for the laid-off; the Re-employment Project is full of pitfalls; and 
                                                             
31 Rawski, 2002 
32
 China Labor Bulletin, http://www.clb.org.hk/en/node/100153 
33
 Ibid., 
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immense challenges of both resource scarcity and administrative incapacity characterize the 
national-scale social welfare programme.
34
 However, it is not justifiable to say the 
re-employment program did not have any fruits, despite that the re-employment of laid-off 
workers never reached 100% though the official channel. Table 1 and 2 displays the total 
number of reemployment and yearly decrease of laid-off workers since 1998. The total 
number of reemployment from 1998 to 2005 is 19,740,000 and the number of laid-off 
workers decreased to 606,000 in 2004. 
 
Table 1: Laid-off workers 1999-2005, Unit: 10,000 person 
 
year Registered Laid-off 
workers 
No. of increase No. of Reemployment 
balance as in 1998 691.8   
1998 594.8 562.2 610 
1999 652.5 618.6 491 
2000 657.2 445.5 361 
2001 515.4 234.3 227 
2002 409.9 162.1 120 
2003 260.2 103 85 
2004 153 34.3 47 
2005 60.6 14.8 34 
1998-2005  2174.8 1974 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006 
 
Table 2: Yearly decrease of laid-off workers 1999-2005 through Reemployment 
Unit: 10,000 person 
 
year No. of decrease No. of 
reemployment 
% of reemployment in 
all decrease 
balance as in 1998    
1998 659.3 610 93% 
1999 557.7 491 88% 
2000 440.8 361 82% 
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2001 376.2 227 60% 
2002 267.6 120 45% 
2003 249.0 85 34% 
2004 141.5 47 33% 
2005 107.2 34 32% 
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2006  
 
Figure 4: Percentage of SOE workers in all employment 1994 - 2007 
  
Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2008 
 
Yet although surplus labor remains to be a severe problem for both pre-privatized SOEs and 
post-privatized SOEs, some other quantitative research surprisingly indicate that China’s 
privatization did not bring a huge shock in rural areas. In rural TVEs sector, Junichi Ito (2006) 
pointed out that unlike the privatization of SOEs in urban areas, the ownership reform of 
SOEs in rural China did not generate massive unemployment.
35
 In urban areas, Bai believed 
that privatization in China had little impact on the change of employment: while shrinking of 
the labor force before privatization was observed and could have also taken place even before 
                                                             
35 Ito, Junichi, “Economic and Institutional Reform Packages and Their Impact on Productivity: A Case Study of Chinese 
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the sample period, there was no evidence for an accelerated layoff of surplus labor after the 
privatization. Bai also pointed out that even some privatized SOEs were forced to limit their 
numbers of laid-off workers, due to the huge political pressure of the central government to 
maintain social stability in some of deals as parts of privatization. This suggests that 
privatization was harmonious, consistent with multitask theory that delaying the privatization 
of state-owned enterprises as a second-best way of absorbing surplus labor force, and 




Impacts of the resurging state sector 
The increasing monopolies in many key industries and the resurging of the state sector are 
raising many concerns, as it may indicate a turning point in China’s market-oriented 
transition. First of all, “state advances” hampers the development of millions of small private 
enterprises. The history of China’s private sector has been relatively short compared to other 
mature markets. It is facing lots of barriers since the Opening up and Reform era, including 
barriers in access to capital (especially from national banks), lack of human capital, and lack 
of competiveness confronting with SOEs which are under the umbrella of central authorities. 
The “state advances” in the past decade even deteriorate the situation, especially during the 
financial crisis when numerous private companies suffered from huge damages. Due to the 
close tie with the government, the shareholder of SOEs, state-owned firms introduce lobbying 
activities which will increase the entry barrier for the market, in turn damaging the principle 
of competition in the market economy.  
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Secondly, the state monopolies also impacted the living standards of Chinese people. One 
example is the increasing state power in the real estate sector. As discussed before, the 
purchasing of large tracts of lands by state-owned real estate developers is a critical factor in 
driving the housing prices up. Others argue that a stronger state sector only benefits a small 
group of people. “Despite making vast profits by taking advantage of their monopoly 
positions, state-owned enterprises pay relatively little in the way of dividends to the 
government, their shareholder. Ultimately, it is not the general public, but only executives and 
employees of these enterprises who reap the benefits by receiving high salaries and 
bonuses.”37 
 
Why Insufficient or Ineffective? 
Managerial Abuse 
In many aspects, as mentioned above, the SOEs reform and privatization are slow and 
ineffective. What are the factors leading to the insufficiency and ineffectiveness? The first 
explanation involves corporate governance. There are basically two types of corporate 
governance system, namely the market based and the control based. The China case is very 
distinctive: as a result of the weakness of both control-based and market-based system of 
managerial oversight, Chinese state firm managers have been extraordinarily independent, 
resulting in the abuse of managerial power in some cases. Naughton (2005) mentioned that 
although the penalties for corruption are severe, the overall institutional environment makes 
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corruption relatively difficult to detect and punish unless it is particularly overt.
38
 Some 
specific examples include: selling public resources for a price slightly under the true market 
price to a related party; setting up a subsidiary, staffed by family members, that receives 





In transition economies like China, SOEs not only have the economic function of production, 
but also are in charge of providing social welfare and maintaining employment, due to the 
lack of independent and effective social welfare net. Thus the central government is not 
willing to implement complete SOEs reform. Bai (2000) utilized the “multitask theory” to 
explain why in almost all the transition economies, the reforms of SOEs have been slow and 
SOEs continue to have poor financial performance. At the beginning of the reform, 
independent agencies specializing in providing a social safety net are missing because before 
transition SOEs are majorly responsible for taking over this important task. Since building a 
social safety net is very complicated, it is almost impossible to establish such an efficient 
system immediately even if the funding is adequate. Consequently, during transition, the 
government selects to slow down the pace of privatization in order to keep a certain number 
of SOEs to maintain social stability. Applying this theory to China’s incomplete 
transformation of ownership structure, we believe that the coexistence of SOEs and 
non-SOEs in China is “a second-best arrangement that helps maintain social stability and thus 
                                                             
38 Naughton, Barry, The Chinese Economy: Transition and Growth, MIT Press 2005, pp. 323 
39 For more discussion refer to Ding, X. L., “The Illicit Asset Stripping of Chinese State Firm”, China Journal, no.43, 
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protects the business environment of all firms.”40 
 
Policy Recommendations 
Corporate governance matters 
Privatization deals with assets and ownership, while corporatization deals with corporate 
governance. To increasingly improve the performance of SOEs, it is not adequate to merely 
transform its ownership structure, but also necessary to introduce mechanisms to make firms 
operate better. Corporatization is definitely the solution, which can minimize the potential 
conflict of interest between those with control and those with income rights. According to 
OECD report, corporate governance refers to the set of mechanisms that induce individuals 
with de facto control over assets to make decisions that maximize the value of the company 
to the owners.
41
 In retrospect, China actually has already adopted a series of policies of 
corporatization to improve corporate governance, particularly after the mid of 1990s. 
 
Aivazian, Ge and Qiu (2005) suggest that it is optimal for governments to carry out 
corporatization of SOEs before eventual privatization, and even without privatization, 
corporate governance reform along is a potential effective way to improve performance of 
SEOs.
42
 By corporatization, SOEs are able to enhance their efficiency by better monitoring 
of managers, improvements in information-sharing channels, and a reduction in governmental 
political intervention. In sum, corporatization and privatization are two mutual influenced 
                                                             
40 See Bai Chong-en, Lu, Jiangyong, and Tao, Zhigang, “The Multitask Theory of State Enterprises Reform: Empirical 
Evidence from China”, The American Economic Review, Vol. 96, No. 2, May 2006, and Bai, Chong-en, Li, David D., and 
Tao, Zhigang, “A Multitask Theory of State Enterprises Reform”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 28 2000 
41 OECD 2004 
42 Aivizian, Varouj A., Ge, Ying, and Qiu, Jiaping, “Can Corporatization improve the performance of state-owned 
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solutions to improve SOEs performance. On one hand, corporatization enables privatization, 
either complete privatization or diversification of ownership by selling off minority stakes to 
the public or to strategic investors. On the other, corporatization can leave unsolved problems 





Another approach for deeper SOEs reform is innovation. For a long time Chinese enterprises 
were at the bottom of value chain due to the lack of innovative spirit. One of the legacies of 
central planned economy is the over capitalization of Chinese industrial enterprises. The 
reliance on capital-intensive industries is promoted by financial repression that provides 
inexpensive capital to industry.
44
 That is the reason why numerous economists are proposing 
a “rebalancing” Chinese economy which relies less on exports and investment. An increasing 
input of R&D may enhance SOEs’ performance and make it more sustainable. In fact, 
building the national innovation system has already been put on agenda in 2006 when the 
central government initiated the Middle to Long-term Plan for Sciences and Technology 
Development (MLP). The overreaching goal is to make China an innovation-oriented society 
by the year 2020 and over the long term - one of the world’s leading “innovation economies”. 
It emphasizes the need to develop capabilities for “indigenous” or “home-grown 
innovation”.45 This has been widely regarded as the signal for Chinese enterprises to shift 
from simply copying foreign advanced technologies to developing their own to replace 
                                                             
43 As Alchian recognized, in some cases it is not easy or possible to impose extra corrective constraints as offsets on public 
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44 See Jefferson, Gray H., and Su, Jian, “Privatization and Restructuring in China: Evidence from Shareholding Ownership: 
1995-2001”, Journal of Comparative Economics, 34 2006 
45 OECD (2008), OECD Reviews of Innovation Policy: China, 2008, pp. 41 
Weatherhead East Asian Institute 
Columbia University 
 27 / 30 
 
Western technologies, and it has rose broad concern in the Western world. Through investing 
more on R&D, Chinese state enterprises will not only increase their efficiency and to pursue 





Social Safety Net Building 
As mentioned above, based on the arguments of multitask theory, one of the most critical 
reasons why most SOEs privatization is slow and incomplete is the lack of independent and 
effective agencies providing a social safety net other than SOEs. Thus a third approach is to 
build genuine social safety system. In the process of privatization which resulted in mass 
layoff of workers, the central government seemed not care too much about the principles of 
fairness and justice. “The government has never made it an official national policy and no 
national legislation exists to dictate the process.”47 Yet the installation of a genuine social 
security net is already under construction. The longer-range goal is to create a stand-alone 
social security network, comprising four separate types of insurance: for pensions, 
unemployment, medical care, and work injury.48 But obstructing the fulfillment of the state’s 
projections are the refusal or inability of firms to make their contributions to pools, 
misappropriation of funds, a lack of objective standards in issuing the funds, and problems in 
transferring insurance after working for many years in a given firm.
49
 
                                                             
46 However, the MLP and China’s Indigenous Innovation program also raised some concerns in the Western world. Some 
scholars argued that the true purpose o MLP was to use China’s own technology to replace foreigners. See James McGregor, 
“China’s Drive for ‘Indigenous Innovation’: A Web of Industrial Policies”, Global Regulatory Corporation Project 
47 Feng, pp. 45 
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This article has firstly explored the policy problems existing before privatization including 
surplus labor in SOEs, and deficiency in firm performance, then introduced the historical 
process of policy implementation since the mid-1990s. This article also characterizes China’s 
privatization as selective and gradual, insider privatization, less financial constraints, and 
distinction between rural and urban enterprises. One particular point need to be emphasized 
here is the “state advances and private retreats” in the past decade especially after the 
financial crisis. Many signals have indicated that the central authorities have re-emphasized 
the role of SOEs through a series of stimulus plan and organizational adjustment. Then it 
analyzes the pros and cons of this policy, especially the impacts of the advancing state. 
 
This paper also points out that managerial abuse and lack of independent, effective social 
safety net are key reasons why it has been insufficient and ineffective in some aspects. The 
last part proposes three approaches for further SOEs reform, namely thorough corporatization, 
more input on innovation, and building a genuine social safety system for the whole nation. 
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